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The United States Trade Embargo on
Mexican Tuna: A Necessary
Conservationist Measure or an
Unfair Trade Barrier?
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, issues of international trade and environmental pro-
tection have inhabited largely separate political spheres.1 The inter-
national community, however, is quickly recognizing environmental
protection as a global concern, 2 and, as a result, these two areas of
public policy can no longer be kept apart. 3 A former United States
Treaty official recently commented that the environment will be the
most important trade issue of the 1990s.4 The United States' free
trade negotiations provide a poignant example of the convergence of
these two issues. While the Bush administration aggressively pursues
a free-trade pact with Mexico, both the United States Congress and
environmental groups worry that such an agreement could lead to
environmental backsliding. 5 Environmentalists fear that a free trade
agreement will supersede and weaken the United States' federal and
state environmental laws. 6 Although Congress expresses concern
over the environment, its objections to free trade with Mexico stem in
part from a fear of losing domestic jobs. 7 Congress believes that
1. Before the latter part of the twentieth century, nations had few environmental or
conservationist regulations. However, scientific research, the media, politicians, and environ-
mental groups have played large roles in creating public awareness of environmental problems.
See Robert W. Helm & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental Reg-
ulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (1989).
2. See generally id.
3. GA TT: Trading Nations Reconvene Environment Committee, GREENWIRE, Oct. 16,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; see also Baucus Calls for Environmental
Code in GA TT Modeled After Subsidies Code, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1568 (Oct.
30, 1991) [hereinafter Baucus Calls].
4. See Baucus Calls, supra note 3 (statement by Michael Smith).
5. See Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade; "No Country Can Protect Its
Own Smidgen of Air or Ocean," WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21.
6. Primer: A Layperson's Guide to Trade and the Environment, GREENWIRE, Oct. 16,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
7. A report by Joseph Haring, Director of the Pasadena Research Institute, predicts
that Southern California will lose half of its 125,000 metal-finishing jobs to Mexico over the
next five years as employers try to escape the region's strict air quality standards. STAFF OF
THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE 102D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
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United States producers will take advantage of the comparatively
loose environmental standards in Mexico8 and move their production
across the border.9 This practice could affect both the United States'
economy and the environment.10
These issues culminated on August 28, 1990, when the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California issued its
decision in Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher. I The court ordered the
United States Department of Commerce to ban the importation of
tuna from Mexico and four other nations.' 2 The court ordered the
ban to remain in effect until the Commerce Department could show
proof that the affected nations were complying with the requirements
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"). 13 Although the
Commerce Department ostensibly imposed the embargo on Septem-
ber 6, 1990, it proceeded to lift the ban on Mexican tuna the very next
REPORT ENTITLED: NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: TOO FAST A TRACK?
(1991) (Prepared at the direction of Sam Gejdenson).
8. A congressional subcommittee reported that Mexico's environmental laws are "quite
good," but that the laws are poorly enforced. Id.
9. See Hearing of the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcomm. and the West-
ern Hemisphere Affairs Subcomm. of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991), FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current
File (Congress' objections to free trade with Mexico may stem from fear of losing domestic
jobs rather than from concern over the environment.).
10. Many United States firms currently take advantage of the more flexible environmen-
tal standards in Mexico. Presently, there are nearly 530 foreign-owned firms, known as "ma-
quiladoras," in Tijuana, Mexico. Maquiladoras have been allowed into Mexico under special
trade rules since 1965. These industries have significantly fouled the water, air, and soil. See
e.g., Judy Pasternak, Firms Find a Haven from US. Environmental Rules, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1991, at Al.
11. 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). The court
granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, restraining the Secretary of the
Treasury from allowing importation of commercial yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products
harvested with purse seine nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific by any foreign nation. The court
restrained further importation
unless and until the Secretary of Commerce makes a positive finding based upon
documentary evidence provided by the government of the exporting nation that the
average rate of the incidental taking by vessels of such foreign nation is no more than
2.0 times that of the United States vessels during the same period.
Id. at 976.
12. The other four nations to which the ban applied were Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador,
and Vanatu. Id.
13. Id. The MMPA, codified and amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988), essentially
sets a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals. The Act, however,
provides for significant exceptions to the moratorium. For an excellent discussion of the
MMPA, see Laura L. Lones, Note, The Marine Mammal Protection Act and International
Protection of Cetaceans: A Unilateral Attempt to Effectuate Transnational Conservation, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997 (1989).
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day. 14 Subseqently, the district court granted Earth Island, the envi-
ronmental group which was the plaintiff in the case, its request for a
temporary restraining order stopping the importation of tuna from
Mexico.15 On October 19, 1990, the district court granted the plain-
tiff's request to convert the temporary restraining order to a prelimi-
nary injunction and the government filed an appeal. 16 On April 11,
1991, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and rein-
stated the ban.' 7 The ban is currently in effect.
Concurrently, however, at Mexico's request, the United States
and Mexico held consultations on the embargo. " When these consul-
tations failed to provide a solution, Mexico requested that the Con-
tracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") establish a panel to mediate the dispute.' 9 The Con-
tracting Parties created what has been called the Mexican Tuna Panel
on February 6, 1991.20 Mexico's complaint alleged that the embargo
constituted an unfair trade practice. 2' On August 16, 1991, the Mexi-
can Tuna Panel ruled that the United States' embargo conflicts with
the rules of the international trading system.22 Mexico has requested
the full GATT Council to defer its review of the matter while Mexico
attempts to develop a plan that will satisfy the United States. 23 Nev-
ertheless, if the full GATT Council eventually reviews and adopts the
Mexican Tuna Panel's decision, the United States must lift the
14. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir. 1991).
15. The district court issued the restraining order on October 4, 1990. Id.
16. Id. at 1452.
17. Id. at 1449.
18. Consultations were held on December 19, 1990. United States Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna: Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Panel Report].
19. Mexico requested the panel on January 25, 1991. Id. at 1.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Mexico Agrees to Defer Action on Complaint on US. Tuna Embargo, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1351 (Sept. 18, 1991). The European Community has threatened to file
its own formal complaint after the GATT Council did not adopt the Panel Report at its Febru-
ary 1992 meeting. GATT Council Refuses EC Request to Adopt Panel Report on U.S. Tuna
Embargo, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 353 (Feb. 26, 1992). At the March 18, 1992,
GATT Council meeting, the European Community and other nations urged the United States
and Mexico to adopt the Panel Report, despite the fact that the United States and Mexico said
they were close to resolution of the matter. Representatives of the European Community ar-
gued that the Panel Report should be adopted on principle. EC Urges Adoption of Tuna Re-
port but U.S., Mexico Claim Accord is Near, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 13, at 524 (Mar.
25, 1992).
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embargo.24
Further complicating the issue, on January 10, 1992, United
States District Court Judge Henderson ruled that the United States
must impose a secondary embargo on tuna imports from countries
that permit or sanction purchases of dolphin-unsafe tuna from Mex-
ico, Venezuela, and Vanatu. 25 In order to avoid the embargo, these
nations must certify that they do not purchase tuna from countries
that are barred from directly exporting tuna to the United States. 26 In
accordance with the decision, on January 31, 1992, the United States
Customs Service banned tuna imports from twenty nations.
27
This Comment will first examine the history and purpose of the
MMPA. Second, it will discuss the structure and dispute resolution
process of the GATT. Third, it will outline both the United States
and Mexican views of the recent trade embargo. Fourth, this Com-
ment will discuss the Mexican Tuna Panel's findings and critique its
decision, including its potential ramifications on the environment.
Fifth, this Comment will explore weaknesses in the MMPA. Sixth,
this Comment will offer solutions to this problem, including revising
the GATT as well as the MMPA. This Comment concludes by pro-
posing that the Contracting Parties to the GATT adopt regulations
that protect the environment.
II. THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
A. General Overview
Congress passed the MMPA in 1972,28 placing a "moratorium
24. See Ivo Van Bael, The GA TT Dispute Settlement Procedure, 22 J. WORLD TRADE,
Aug. 1988, at 67.
25. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826, 828 (N.D. Cal. 1992). See also
Keith Bradsher, U.S. Told to Ban Tuna Imports to Protect Dolphins, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15,
1992, at D16. Note that before this secondary embargo went into effect, the GATT Panel
determined that the MMPA provisions for a secondary embargo on intermediary nations vio-
lated the GATT rules. See infra notes 119, 165.
26. See Earth Island, 785 F. Supp. 826.
27. The Customs Service enforced the embargo on the following nations: Canada, Japan,
Spain, Colombia, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Thailand, Ecuador, The
Marshall Islands of Trinidad and Tobago, France, the Netherlands, Antilles, the United King-
dom, Indonesia, Panama, and Venezuela. U.S. Customs to Block Import of Tuna Not Dolphin-
Safe, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
28. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1988)). The MMPA provides for protection of all types of marine mammals. See Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988). This Comment addresses only the
provisions protecting dolphins from tuna fishers.
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on the taking and importation of marine mammals. '29 It enacted the
law partially in response to the high rate of "incidental" dolphin mor-
tality30 caused by tuna fishers. Because yellowfin tuna is known to
swim beneath schools of dolphin in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean ("ETP"),31 tuna fishers in this region often set large circular
nets, called purse seine nets, directly over schools of dolphin. 32 When
Congress enacted the MMPA, tuna fishers using this netting method
were killing more than 250,000 dolphins each year.33
When the MMPA first went into effect in 1972, the fishing indus-
try claimed that the technology to reduce dolphin mortality was avail-
able.34 Thus, Congress granted a two-year exemption from the
MMPA for commercial fishing operations. 35 When this exemption
expired, commercial fishers would be subject to the requirements of
the MMPA and had to obtain permits from the National Marine
Fisheries Service ("NMFS")36 in order to take any marine mammals
in the course of fishing.37 In 1980, the NMFS issued a five-year gen-
eral permit to all United States Fishers in the ETP.38 The permit set
29. Id.
30. The MMPA uses the terms "incidental taking" and "incidental killing" interchangea-
bly to refer to the deaths of dolphins caused by fishers. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988).
31. The ETP, as defined by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in-
cludes the area of the Pacific Ocean bounded by 40 degrees north latitude, 40 degrees south
latitude, 160 degrees west longitude, and the coastlines of North, Central, and South America.
50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1988).
32. Tuna fishers take advantage of this relationship between tuna and dolphins. Purse
seine netting is the practice of tuna fishers in the Eastern Tropical Pacific whereby they set
very large circular nets on schools of dolphin in order to catch the tuna swimming underneath.
The dolphins are rounded up with speedboats, which then encircle the dolphins with a mile
long fence of net that drops about 100 feet deep. The fishers then draw cables on the bottom of
the net, trapping the dolphins and any tuna swimming underneath. Once the nets are
"pursed," the fishers lower them back into the water a few feet to try to release the dolphins.
However, the process of rounding up the dolphins often disorients them and makes them un-
able to escape. Dolphins that are still trapped in the nets when the fishers raise them often
drown and/or have their fins torn off by the nets. Kenneth Brower, The Destruction of the
Dolphins, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1989, at 35, 37-48.
33. Lones, supra note 13, at 999.
34. Ken Schoolcraft Jr., Recent Developments: Congress Amends the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, 62 OR. L. REV. 257, 271 (1983).
35. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027, 1030 (1972).
36. The National Marine Fisheries Service is a branch of the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration ("NOAA"), which administers the MMPA. See 50 C.F.R. § 216
(1990).
37. Id.
38. Taking and Related Acts Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations, 45 Fed. Reg.
72, 187 (1979) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24).
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the annual taking limit for dolphin at 20,500. 39 The 1984 amend-
ments to the MMPA authorized the extension of this general permit
for every year after 1984.40 Thus, although the MMPA's stated goal
is to annually reduce the number of dolphins that can be taken inci-
dentally by commercial fishing until that number approaches zero,
41
the annual limit for domestic fishers will permanently remain at
20,500.
In response to pressure from environmental groups, 42 Congress
again amended the MMPA in 1988 with more stringent require-
ments.43 The 1988 amendments reinstated a prohibition on setting
nets after sunset,44 providing that "[t]he Secretary shall, by January 1,
1989, prescribe regulations to ensure that the backdown procedure
during sets of the purse seine net on marine mammals is completed
and rolling of the net to sack up has begun no later than thirty min-
utes after sundown. ' ' 45 The NMFS had implemented a similar prohi-
bition on sundown sets in 1980, but revoked it after only eight days
due to pressure from the tuna industry.
46
The 1988 amendments also required that NMFS observers be
placed on United States tuna boats fishing in the ETP at all times.47
These observers document fishing operations and report dolphin
mortalities.48
39. Id.
40. Pub. L. No. 98-364, 98 Stat. 440 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h) (1988)).
41. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027, 1030
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(1988)).
42. See Brower, supra note 32, at 57-58. According to Sam LaBudde of The Earth Island
Institute, "practically the entire environmental community" attended the reauthorization
hearings for the Marine Mammal Protection Act. All of these environmental organizations
want purse seining stopped. Id. at 58.
43. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711, 102
Stat. 4755 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1361-1407 (1988)).
44. This practice, referred to as "sundown sets," causes greater dolphin mortality due to
low visibility. See Brower, supra note 32, at 58.
45. Pub. L. No. 100-711, 102 Stat. 4755, 4767 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(iv)
(1988)). The "backdown procedure" is the procedure in which the fishers lower their nets
several feet beneath the water's surface. This procedure is supposed to allow the dolphins
swimming above the tuna to escape the net.
46. See Brower, supra note 32, at 58.
47. Pub. L. No. 100-711, 102 Stat 4755, 4768 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(b)(3)(B)
(1988)).
48. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; "Dolphin Safe" Tuna Labeling, 56 Fed.
Reg. 47,418 (1991) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 216, 247).
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B. International Aspects
In addition to the restrictions on United States tuna boats, the
1988 amendments for the first time defined a regulatory program for
foreign tuna boats that export their tuna to the United States. 49 The
requirements of this program included: (1) by the end of the 1989
fishing season, foreign nations must have an incidental taking rate on
their tuna vessels no greater than 2.0 times that of United States' ves-
sels, and no greater than 1.25 times that of the United States by the
end of 1990 and thereafter;50 (2) foreign vessels must discontinue both
sundown sets and encircling pure schools of marine mammals;5' and
(3) a porpoise mortality observer from the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission ("IATTC") must be present on all tuna boats in
order to monitor the number of dolphin takings. 52 Furthermore, cov-
erage by the observers must be equal to those on the United States
boats during the same period.53
If an exporting nation fails to comply with this regulatory pro-
gram, the regulations require the Secretary of the Treasury to ban any
imports of tuna from that nation. 54 Additionally, within sixty days of
the original embargo, the Secretary must place a secondary embargo
on any imports of tuna from intermediary nations that purchase tuna
from a noncomplying nation. 55
III. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
("GATT")
A. General Overview
The GATT 56 constitutes both a multilateral agreement and a
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (1988).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (1988).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(IV) (1988). The dolphin mortality rate may also be
monitored by an equivalent international program in which the United States participates or
which is approved by the Secretary of State. Id.
53. Id. The National Marine Fisheries Services determined that one hundred percent
observer coverage is impossible for the 1992 fishing season, and thus decided that seventy-five
percent coverage will be acceptable. The seventy-five percent standard will give the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission time to recruit and train additional observers. One hun-
dred percent observer coverage is intended for all subsequent fishing seasons. Taking and
Importing of Marine Mammals, 57 Fed. Reg. 668 (1992).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (1988). Congress enacted this provision of the MMPA to
prevent "tuna laundering," a situation where an embargoed nation sells tuna to third-party
nations who in turn export it to the United States. See Earth Island, 785 F. Supp. at 829.
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
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corresponding international organization. 57 The GATT is the only
multinational body governing international trade and trade relations
that determines the legal rights and obligations between its member
countries. 5 Entered into force in 1948, 59 by 1991 the GATT reported
having 103 member-countries,60 approximately two-thirds of which
are less developed countries.61 In 1990, GATT member-countries ac-
counted for ninety percent of world trade. 62
The founding countries created the GATT in order to re-estab-
lish trade relations that were damaged by the protectionist policies
that arose from the Great Depression and World War 11.63 They
designed the GATT with the hope of stabilizing trade conditions. 64
One of the main goals of the GATT was to ensure equal access to
markets and reciprocity in trade concessions. 65
The GATT's main objective is to
liberalize international trade and place it on a secure basis, thereby
contributing to the economic growth, development and welfare of
the world's people. It acts as both a code of rules and as a forum in
which countries can discuss solutions to their trade problems and
negotiate the reduction of various trade restrictive and distortive
measures. 66
Another significant function of the GATT is to facilitate the economic
growth of developing countries. 67
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATr]. The GATT is an extremely complex
institution. This Comment discusses the GATT only to the extent necessary to understand the
United States-Mexico tuna dispute. For detailed information on the GATT, see JOHN HOw-
ARD JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC RELATIONS (1989) and OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1987).
57. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE
POLICY 15 (1987).
58. LONG, supra note 56, at 4.
59. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES 1990, at 4
(1991).
60. See Guatemala Confirmed as 103rd Member, Focus (GATT Newsletter), Oct. 1991,
at 6.
61. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, supra note 59. The term "less
developed countries," as used in this Comment refers to countries that are in the early stages of
economic development.
62. Id.
63. LONG, Supra note 56, at 5.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, supra note 59, at 4.
67. Id. Although the traditional principles of the GATT favor non-discrimination and
reciprocity, these principles are often bent to the advantage of less developed countries. See
910 [Vol. 14:903
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B. GA 77 Negotiations
The Contracting Parties to the GATT have completed seven
rounds of negotiations on international trade policies and practices.
68
The member-countries began the eighth round, the "Uruguay
Round," in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September, 1986.69 Although
the earlier rounds of GATT negotiations focused primarily on reduc-
ing tariffs and quantity restrictions on imports, the Uruguay Round
negotiations are more complex. According to the GATT, the Uru-
guay Round "seeks to ensure that the multilateral trading system is
capable of meeting the commercial realities and challenges of the
1990s and beyond."
'70
The Uruguay Round negotiations have also focused more heavily
on non-tariff barriers7' than did previous rounds. 72 Non-tariff barri-
ers include broad national policies on foreign trade, not presently reg-
ulated by the GATT.73 Because agreements to eliminate non-tariff
barriers could limit the future policies of the member-countries' na-
tional governments, this area of negotiations is politically sensitive.
74
Members anticipated that this round of negotiations would be the
most difficult yet,75 and, in fact, the Uruguay Round did not conclude
by the end of 1990 as scheduled. 76 On February 26, 1991, the GATT
rescheduled the talks for a prolonged run in Geneva, Switzerland.
77
LONG, supra note 56, at 94-97. For example, under GAIT rules, developed countries do not
expect reciprocity from trade agreement concessions with less developed countries. See RoB-
ERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 226-28 (1990).
68. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, supra note 59, at 19.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. At the time the GATT was formed, the major barriers to international trade were
quantitative restrictions and high custom duties. Thus, the first GATT negotiations focused
on these problems. LONG, supra note 56, at 25. Non-tariff barriers are more subtle barriers to
trade. They are government policies regarding imports and exports which purport to serve a
valid government interest other than trade relations. These interests can include labeling re-
quirements, inspection requirements, product standards, and pollution control. See JACKSON,
supra note 56, at 130-31.
72. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 57, at 37.
73. Id. at 12.
74. For example, the United States is currently lobbying for reform in European agricul-
tural policies. However, success in this area may require reciprocal reforms in United States
farm policies, a highly political issue. See id.
75. Id.
76. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, supra note 59, at 27.
77. Uruguay Round Negotiations Back on Track as Participants Agree to Tackle Farm
Trade, Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA), at A-21 (Feb. 27, 1991).
1992]
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C. Organization of GA.TT
Senior officials from each member-country generally meet once a
year at the Session of Contracting Parties.78 The Council of Repre-
sentatives meets an average of nine times each year.79 Representatives
of all Contracting Parties who wish to become members of the Coun-
cil may do so.80 The Council is authorized to address all questions
discussed by the Contracting Parties during these sessions, as well as
any other urgent matters. 8'
The Council also has the authority to establish any subsidiary
body it considers necessary. 82 For example, the Council often creates
a panel of experts to mediate disputes between member-countries.
83
In addition, several specialized standing committees meet regularly to
discuss various aspects of trade policies and practices established dur-
ing the negotiation sessions.8
D. Dispute Settlement Procedure
The GATT dispute settlement system assists parties in settling
their differences, rather than holding oral arguments and issuing rul-
ings.85 Thus, when Contracting Parties disagree over trade policies,
such as the disagreement over the United States' embargo on Mexican
tuna, the GATT first encourages them to reconcile the problem
among themselves. 86 If the parties cannot resolve the dispute on their
own, one or both parties may request a mediation panel of third party
representatives, as Mexico did in response to the United States' em-
bargo.87 The panel then hears each party's argument and makes a
recommendation. 88
Before reporting its findings to the Contracting Parties, the panel
78. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, supra note 59, at 4. Legally, the
authority to interpret the provisions of the GATT lies exclusively with the Contracting Parties.
Sessions of the Contracting Parties are not open to the public but are held in private in order to
discourage political debate. LONG, supra note 56, at 46.
79. LONG, supra note 56, at 48.
80. Id. at 46.
81. Id. at 47.
82. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, supra note 59, at 4.
83. Id.
84. See LONG, supra note 56, at 48-49.
85. See generally Van Bad, supra note 24.
86. Id.; see GATT, supra note 56, art. XXII.
87. While there is no automatic right to have a panel established, the request has always
been granted. Van Bad, supra note 24, at 68.
88. Id.
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issues its findings, decision, and recommendations to the disputing
parties.8 9 In order to encourage the parties to reach a bilateral settle-
ment, the panel gives them one to two months to examine its report
and to attempt to settle the dispute among themselves. 90 If the parties
are unable to reach an agreement, the panel gives the report to the full
Council.91 At the next Council session, the Council members either
adopt or reject the panel's recommendation. 92 Before the full Council
can adopt the panel's report, the members must come to a consen-
sus. 93 The panel's ruling is not binding unless the full Council accepts
it.94 Thus, theoretically, in the present dispute, the United States may
refuse to accept the panel's recommendation and prevent the Council
from adopting it. However, the Council has never actually rejected a
panel report. 95
Once the Council adopts a panel decision, it is legally binding. 96
The Contracting Parties may then make recommendations to the con-
cerned parties regarding what action they should take,97 and supervise
all matters on which they have made recommendations. 98 If one of
the parties to the dispute does not comply with the recommendations,
the other party can ask the GATT to intervene a second time.99 Such
intervention may include authorizing a retaliatory measure against
the non-complying party.1°°
IV. THE EMBARGO DISPUTE
A. Factual Background
This section of the Comment discusses the dispute over the
United States embargo on Mexican tuna.10' First, this section pro-
89. Id. at 69.
90. Id. In the present case, the Mexican Tuna Panel issued its decision in August 1991,
but did not release its report to the public until three months later.
91. Van Bael, supra note 56, at 69.
92. LONG, supra note 56, at 77. "If no bilateral settlement has been reached, the panel
submits its findings and recommendations to the Council in written form. Normally included
are findings, observations on the applicability of relevant provisions of the General Agreement,
and the main reasons for the findings and recommendations that have been put forward." Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 48.
95. LONG, supra note 56, at 77.
96. GATT, supra note 56, art. XXIII:2.
97. Id.
98. LONG, supra note 56, at 78.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 77.
101. In addition to its charges that the embargo violated the GATT, Mexico's complaint
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vides the background of the dispute and the parties' main arguments.
This section then analyzes the Mexican Tuna Panel's findings.
Mexico has the second largest and most modem tuna fleet in the
world. 10 2 The fleet provides approximately 3,000 jobs. 0 3 The inter-
national tuna trade is a valued source of foreign currency for Mex-
ico.10 4 Mexico also has the largest tuna fleet fishing in the ETP, the
region where yellowfin tuna swim with the dolphins. 0 5 Environmen-
talists estimate that the Mexican tuna fleet kills 50,000 dolphins annu-
ally. 10 6 However, because Mexico has not had full coverage by Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission ("IATTC") observers, 0 7 the
actual numbers are uncertain.
The United States is the second largest consumer of tuna in the
world, 0 8 and seventy percent of the tuna consumed in the United
States is imported.1°9 Although only about ten percent of Mexico's
tuna exports went to the United States before the embargo,"10 a large
portion of the remainder went to third party nations, many of whom
exported this tuna back to the United States."'
When the United States Department of Commerce imposed the
Mexican tuna embargo, Mexico accused the United States of trying to
argued that the United States' tuna labeling practices also ran afoul of the GATT provisions.
The GATT dispute panel ruled that the United States' labeling procedures did not conflict
with the GATT. See Panel Report, supra note 18, at 49-50. This Comment does not examine
that portion of the Mexican Tuna Panel's decision.
102. David Clark Scott, U.S. Tuna Ban May Snag Trade Talks With Mexico, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 7, 1990, at 6.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See David Schriebera, U.S. Mexico Engage in Tuna War, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug.
29, 1990, at Al.
106. Stuart Auerbach, Raising a Roar Over a Ruling; Trade Pact Imperils Environmental
Laws, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at Dl. Some estimates range as high as 100,000 per year.
See Edward Epstein, Conservationists Bash Salinas'Dolphin Plan, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 27, 1991,
at A14.
107. See Mexico Reaffirms 'Ensenada Commitment' to Dolphin Safety; 100 Percent Fleet
Observation to Begin Ahead of Schedule, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
108. Japan consumes approximately thirty-six percent of the world tuna catch, making it
the largest world consumer. The United States is second, consuming about thirty-one percent.
COMMITrEE ON REDUCING PORPOISE MORTALITY FROM TUNA FISHING, REDUCING
DOLPHIN MORTALITY FROM TUNA FISHING (1992).
109. Id.
110. Schriebera, supra note 105, at Al. In early 1991, estimates of Mexican tuna exported
to the United States were as low as three percent. David Clark Scott, Mexico Chafes as U.S.
Revisits Ban on Tuna Imports Involving Dolphin Kills, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 27,
1991, at 6.
111. See generally Scott, supra note 110.
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protect its tuna industry rather than the dolphins.1 2 In November
1990, Mexico filed a formal complaint against the United States under
the GATT.113 According to a report on the GATT's activities in
1990, "Mexico considered [the United States' embargo] to be incon-
sistent with the United States' obligations under the General Agree-
ment, in particular Article XI:1."
'114
B. Mexico's Primary Arguments
Mexico contested the MMPA's import prohibition provisions
and the concomitant embargo on two principal grounds. 15 First,
Mexico argued that the embargo provisions of the MMPA were in-
consistent with the general prohibition on quantitative restrictions
contained in GATT Article XI.116 Second, Mexico asserted that the
MMPA provisions for comparing yellowfin tuna regulations in the
United States with those of another country violated GATT Article
111.117
Article XI of the GATT calls for a general elimination of quanti-
tative restrictions to international trade, stating:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the terri-
tory of any contracting party or on the exportation or sale for ex-
port of any product destined for the territory of any other
112. See generally Panel Report, supra note 18.
113. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, supra note 59, at 67.
114. Id.
115. In addition to the points discussed in this Comment, Mexico made several other argu-
ments. For instance, Mexico argued that the MMPA violated GATT Article XIII, by estab-
lishing specific discriminatory conditions for a specific geographical area. Panel Report, supra
note 18, at 7. The Mexican Tuna Panel determined that it was not necessary to decide this
issue. Id. at 42. Mexico also claimed that the possible extension of import prohibitions to all
fish products of Mexico under the MMPA was inconsistent with GATT Article XI. Id. at 7.
The Panel found that because this extension of import prohibitions was discretionary under
United States law, this provision was not inconsistent with the GATT. Id. at 43. Finally,
Mexico argued that the labeling provisions of the United States Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act were inconsistent with GATT Article IX. Id. at 8. The Panel either dis-
agreed with Mexico's arguments on these provisions or did not address them. Id. at 50.
116. Id. at 7. Mexico also challenged the provision for a secondary embargo, under 16
U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C), against "intermediary nations" who export tuna to the United States
as a violation of the GATT Article XI. Id. at 8.
117. The relevant provisions of the MMPA are sections 101(a)(2)(B)(I)-(III) and
104(h)(2)(A)-(B) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(2)(B)(I)-(III) and 1374(h)(2)(A)-(B)
(1991)).
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contracting party.' 18
Mexico argued that an "infringement of obligations assumed under
the General Agreement" constituted a prima facie case of "nullifica-
tion or impairment" as defined by GATT Article XXIII.119 Thus,
Mexico asked that the Mexican Tuna Panel recommend revisions by
the United States to bring the MMPA into conformity with the
GATT.12
0
Mexico's second contention was that the MMPA violated Article
III of the GATT. GATT Article 111:1121 states:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other in-
ternal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distri-
bution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations re-
quiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or do-
mestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.1
22
Note Ad Article III, a supplementary provision to Article III,123 fur-
ther states:
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or
requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to
an imported product and to the like domestic product and is col-
lected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time
or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an inter-
nal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or require-
ment of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly
subject to the provisions of Article III.124
Mexico argued that the MMPA was inconsistent with the "like prod-
uct" requirement of Article III and, therefore, applying the MMPA
to Mexican tuna violated the national treatment principles embodied
in Article 111.121 Mexico reasoned that although the United States
118. C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: The New
Nontariff Barriers, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 47, 49 (1990).
119. GATT, supra note 56, art. XXIII.
120. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 8.
121. Article III:l refers to paragraph 1 of Article III in the GATT numbering system.
122. GATr', supra note 56, art. III.
123. The text of the GATT contains interpretative notes entitled Ad Articles which are to
be read in conjunction with their corresponding articles. The Panel Report refers to the inter-
pretative note to Article III as Note Ad Article III. See Panel Report, supra note 18, at 9.
124. GAIT, supra note 56, Note Ad Art. III (emphasis added).
125. Mexico claimed that the MMPA violated all articles of the GATT that contained a
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embargo applied to tuna, the United States was not regulating just
tuna, but "tuna associating with dolphin," a hybrid category "existing
neither in the natural world nor in tariff nomenclature." 126 Due to
this argued inconsistency, Mexico claimed that the MMPA was an
internal regulation that violated national treatment principles when
applied to Mexican tuna. 127 Mexico argued that "internal regulations
on producers [which are inconsistent with the GATT] could not be
imposed at the border on imported products, just as taxes on produ-
cers could not be adjusted for in border tax adjustments on prod-
ucts. '1 28 Furthermore, Mexico claimed that the MMPA violated
Article III because it discriminated between domestic and imported
products based exclusively on the production process. 129 Finally,
Mexico stated that the MMPA provisions favored the United States
fleet over foreign fleets, and thus were inconsistent with Article
111:4.130 Article 111:4 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transporta-
tion, distribution or use.' 31
Mexico noted that the United States fleet had a maximum ceiling of
20,500 incidental dolphin takings per year. Mexico complained that
because the number of incidental dolphin takings allowed for foreign
fleets varied each year, depending upon the performance of the United
States fleet, that number could not be known until the end of the
year. 132 In addition, the number of United States vessels still fishing
in the ETP was very small, resulting in a further reduction on the
"like product" requirement, including Article III. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 11. The
"like product" and national treatment principles of Article III basically require that member
countries treat products imported from another member country equal to domestic products.
These principles are intended to defend against protectionism resulting from internal regula-
tions. However, customs duties are outside the scope of this requirement. LONG, supra note
56, at 9.
126. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 11.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The Panel Report generally refers to tuna fishing as part of the production process of
tuna as a commodity. See generally Panel Report, supra note 18.
130. Id. at 13.
131. GATT, supra note 56, art. III:4.
132. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 13.
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limit of dolphin takings by foreign fleets. 133
C. The United States' Response
The United States argued that GATT Article X1134 did not apply
to the MMPA tuna import restrictions. 35 The United States de-
fended both the restrictions and the embargo based on GATT Article
111136 and Article XX.137
In contesting Mexico's claims that the MMPA violated Article
III, the United States first argued that the provisions of the MMPA
involving yellowfin tuna conformed with GATT Article 111:4.131 The
United States then argued that even if the relevant provisions of the
MMPA transgressed Article III, they fell under the exceptions in Ar-
ticle XX(b) and XX(g).139
The United States specifically claimed that the MMPA require-
ments were regulations affecting a product of national origin within
the meaning of Article 111:4.140 Noting that Article III:4 referred to
the sale and purchase of a product, the United States claimed that no
meaningful distinction existed between regulations affecting the
purchase and sale of a product, and regulations affecting the produc-
tion of a product.' 4' Therefore, the United States reasoned that be-
cause the MMPA regulations required the production methods for
tuna to comport with certain requirements before the tuna could be
sold, the regulations affected the product itself, not merely the pro-
duction process. 142
Furthermore, the United States stated that the MMPA regula-
tions for production of imported tuna were no less favorable than the
regulations on domestic production. 43 In fact, because the MMPA
allows foreign fleets to take twenty-five percent more dolphins than
the domestic fleet, the United States claimed that the MMPA actually
favored foreign nations. 44 Thus, the United States concluded that
133. Id.
134. GATT, supra note 56, art. XI.
135. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 9.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 122-31.
137. See infra text accompanying note 147.
138. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 8.
139. Id. at 8-26.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 12.
143. Id. at 12-14.
144. Id.
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the MMPA regime was fully consistent with the Article III:4 require-
ment that imported goods be treated no less favorably than the like
products of national origin.
145
Finally, the United States argued that regardless of whether the
MMPA provisions conflicted with the GATT regulations in question,
they were authorized under Article XX. 46 Article XX deals with
general exceptions to the Agreement. It provides in relevant part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;
... [or]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption .... 147
The MMPA embargo, according to the United States, was neces-
sary to protect dolphins and thus fell under the exception in Article
XX(b). 48 Since tuna fishers using purse seine nets in the ETP were
deliberately setting nets on dolphins, these dolphins would be killed
without efforts to protect them.' 49 The United States stated that no
alternative measure was proposed or available that was likely to pre-
serve dolphins. 150 Thus, since the MMPA restrictions on yellowfin
tuna fishing are "directly and explicitly" intended to prevent dolphin
mortality or injury, they fall within the Article XX(b) exception.' 5'
Similarly, the United States claimed that the MMPA provisions
fell within Article XX(g). 52 Citing a previous panel report,' 53 the
United States noted that dolphins were an exhaustible natural re-
145. Id.
146. Id. at 15-24.
147. GATT, supra note 56, art. XX.
148. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 17.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 19.
153. Canada Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon: Report of
the Panel, GAT Doc. L/6268 (Mar. 22, 1988) (Available in 35 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 98 (1988-89)) [hereinafter Canadian Salmon Panel Report]; see
infra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
9191992]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J
source.' 5 4 In addition, the need to preserve dolphins is recognized
internationally, as evidenced by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission ("IATTC") and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.' 55 The United States also stressed that Article XX(g)
did not specify that the natural resource must be threatened or that its
provisions were limited to only certain types of conservation
measures.'
56
The United States further noted that the MMPA provisions in
question were not a disguised restriction on trade nor a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination, 5 7 and thus did not violate the
Preamble to Article XX.'58 Rather, the MMPA explicitly identifies
any potential trade effects.' 59 Furthermore, the objective of these pro-
visions is to conserve and protect the lives of dolphins. 16° Finally, the
United States emphasized that the MMPA applied evenly to all coun-
tries harvesting yellowfin tuna in the ETP, except the United States,
which was subject to more stringent restrictions.' 6'
D. The Panel Findings
The Mexican Tuna Panel ("Panel") concluded that the MMPA
provisions did not constitute internal regulations as provided in Arti-
cle III:4.162 The Panel reasoned that since the MMPA provisions reg-
ulated production methods, they did not directly regulate the sale of
tuna, and, thus, did not affect tuna as a product.' 63 Therefore, they
did not constitute the internal regulations to which Note Ad Article
III referred. '64 In addition, the Panel stated that regulations gov-
erning the taking of dolphins "could not possibly affect tuna as a
154. Panel Report, supra note 18 at 19.
155. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122
(1982).
156. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 19.
157. Id. at 24-25.
158. See supra text accompanying note 147.
159. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 24-25.
160. Id. at 25.
161. Id. Note that under the MMPA, foreign fleets can take twenty-five percent more
dolphins than domestic fleets. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
162. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 39-42. Since the Panel found that the United States
domestic regulations on tuna harvesting did not apply to tuna as a product, it determined that
the "intermediary nations" embargo did not fall within the scope of Note Ad Article III, and,
therefore, was a quantitative restriction subject to Article XI. Id. at 48.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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product."' 165 Thus, the Panel concluded that Article 111:4 required
that the United States treat Mexican tuna "no less favorabl[y]" than
United States tuna, regardless of whether the number of dolphin tak-
ings by Mexico corresponded to the number of dolphin takings by the
United States. 1
66
The Panel also found that the MMPA was inconsistent with Ar-
ticle XI:1.167 Noting that Article XI forbids quantitative restrictions
on imports, the Panel stated that the United States' direct import pro-
hibition on certain yellowfin tuna from Mexico, as authorized by the
MMPA, violated Article XI. 16s
In examining the United States' Article XX defense, the Panel
first noted that previous GATT panels limited the scope of Article
XX, stating that it is "not a positive rule establishing obligations in
itself." 169 Furthermore, in interpreting Article XX(b), the Panel
found that the drafting history of the Article did not support ex-
trajurisdictional protection of animal life.' 70 According to the Panel,
the drafters were primarily concerned with promoting sanitary regu-
lations to protect human, animal, and plant life within the jurisdiction
of an importing country.' 7 1 The Panel stated that if it accepted the
United States' broad interpretation of the Article, "each contracting
party could unilaterally determine the life or health protection poli-
cies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without
jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement."' 72 Thus, the
GATT would provide legal security only to those contracting parties
with the same internal regulations' 73
Moreover, according to the Panel, the United States failed to
show that it could not reasonably pursue its dolphin protection objec-
tives through measures consistent with the GATT. 74 Even assuming
that import restrictions were the only means reasonably available to
the United States, the Panel stated that the MMPA provisions were
165. Id. at 41.
166. Id4 at 41-42.
167. Id. at 42. For the text of paragraph 1, see supra text accompanying note 122.
168. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 42. The Panel Report notes that the United States did
not present any arguments on this issue. Id.
169. Id. at 43.
170. Id. at 44-45.
171. Id. at 45.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 46.
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not necessary within the meaning of Article XX(b).' 75 Specifically,
the Panel pointed out that the MMPA linked Mexico's maximum in-
cidental dolphin taking rate to the actual rate recorded for the United
States. 176 Thus, Mexico could not know whether its policies at any
given time conformed to the United States' standards. 177 The Panel
stated that it could not regard a regulation based on such unpredict-
able conditions as necessary to protect the health or the life of
dolphins. 
78
The Panel similarly found that the MMPA could not be justified
under the exception in Article XX(g). 79 The Panel first stated that
the same considerations which led it to reject the extrajudicial inter-
pretation of Article XX(b) similarly applied to Article XX(g).'
80
Thus, Article XX(g) does not permit the United States to impose con-
servation regulations outside its borders.' 8' Additionally, because the
MMPA restrictions on imports of yellowfin tuna were based on indefi-
nite conditions, the Panel stated that the MMPA could not be re-
garded as primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins.
82
Thus, the Panel concluded that the United States' restrictions on
yellowfin tuna imports and the MMPA provisions that authorized
these restrictions were contrary to Article XI: 1, and were not justified
by either Article XX(b) or Article XX(g). 83 The Panel then recom-
mended that "the Contracting Parties request the United States to
bring the above measures into conformity with its obligations under
the General Agreement.'
84
V. CRITIQUE OF THE PANEL REPORT
This section of the Comment focuses on several weaknesses in
the Panel's decision. First, this section examines the Panel's analysis
of the MMPA in connection with GATT Articles III, XX(b) and
XX(g). This section then identifies inconsistencies between the
Panel's decision, the text of the GATT, past GATT dispute resolution
panel reports, and other GATT documents. Next, this section dis-
175. Id. at 46.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 46-47.
180. Id. at 46.
181. Id. at 46-47.
182. Id. at 47.
183. Id. at 44-47.
184. Id. at 51.
[Vol. 14:903
US. Trade Embargo on Mexican Tuna
cusses the conflicts between the present GATT standards and the
need for global environmental protection and conservation. Finally,
this section discusses possible ramifications of the Panel's decision for
the North American Free Trade Agreement.
A. Article III
The Mexican Tuna Panel's analysis of Article III was unsatisfac-
tory in several respects. First, the Panel distinguished between a
product itself and its method of production. 8 5 It stated that Article
III applied only to internal regulations that affect a product "as
such." 8 6 The Panel noted that the MMPA regulates the method of
harvesting tuna, rather than tuna itself. 8 7 Thus, the Panel concluded
that the MMPA did not fall within the scope of Article III.188
Unfortunately, the Panel failed to explain why this distinction
between the regulation of a product and the regulation of its produc-
tion method is meaningful. It did not state that regulation of a prod-
uct was less likely to interfere with free trade than regulation of a
production method. Indeed, the Panel pointed out that the GATT
allowed measures that affect imported products while also affecting
"the like domestic product."'81 9 An example of such a measure is the
United States law prohibiting the importation of automobiles that do
not meet specified emissions requirements.190 Presumably, the ration-
ale behind this type of import prohibition is protection of the environ-
ment. In the present case, harvesting yellowfin tuna in the ETP with
the purse seine method does not itself harm the environment, but its
method of production does. Thus, this distinction between regulation
of the product itself and regulation of its production method is a mere
technicality that does not advance the goal of free trade.
In addition, GATT Article 111:1 refers to "regulations and re-
quirements affecting the internal sale, . . .or use of products, and
internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions."' 191 Arguably,
the MMPA is such a quantitative regulation on processing. Fishing
for yellowfin tuna in the ETP, using the purse seining method and
185. Panel Report, supra note 18; see also text accompanying notes 162-165.
186. See Panel Report, supra note 18, at 41.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 41-42.
189. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 40.
190. See The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1991).
191. GATT, supra note 56, art. 111:1 (emphasis added).
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setting nets on dolphins, necessarily results in the incidental taking of
some dolphins. Under this theory, the MMPA is merely a processing
requirement for yellowfin tuna which places a limit on the number of
dolphins that may be taken in connection with this tuna processing
method. Although the United States made this argument, 192 the
Panel failed to address it.
Furthermore, as the United States acknowledged, the GATT ap-
proves of other internal regulations affecting trade which do not affect
products themselves. The United States referred to a GATT report
regarding marks of origin. 193 This report makes clear that regulations
on marks of origin, which are notations on a product specifying where
it was made, are within the scope of GATT Article 111.194 Yet, such
regulations do not significantly affect the final product itself. In fact,
this type of regulation is more closely related to a specification on
production methods rather than a regulation on the contents of a
product.
B. Article XX(b)
The Mexican Tuna Panel's finding that the drafting history of
Article XX(b) does not support extrajurisdictional application 195 cre-
ates serious problems for conservation efforts like the MMPA. If the
GATT restricts a nation's conservation efforts to its own borders, it
renders protection of highly migratory species impossible. For in-
stance, one nation acting alone cannot adequately protect dolphins
because dolphins do not remain within the physical boundaries of any
one nation. Thus, the Panel's decision provides the United States
with little incentive to continue its dolphin protection program at
home. Indeed, if the Panel's report is accepted, and the domestic pro-
visions of the MMPA remain in effect, the United States' tuna fleet
would probably stop fishing for yellowfin tuna in the ETP because it
would no longer be able to compete with the foreign fleets.1
96
192. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 11-12.
193. Report of the Working Party on "Certificates of Origin, Marks of Origin, Consular
Formalities," GATT Doc. L/595 (available in 55 GATT BASIc DOCUMENTS AND SELECTED
INSTRUMENTS 102 (1956)); see also Panel Report, supra note 18, at 13.
194. See Report of the Working Party on "Certificates of Origin, Marks of Origin, Consular
Formalities," supra note 193.
195. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 45.
196. Some commentators have stated that, since the MMPA limitations on dolphin tak-
ings went into effect, many United States yellowfin tuna fishers have adopted a "flag of conven-
ience." This is the practice of registering and sailing their ships under another nation's flag.
See Lones, supra note 13, at 1017. Nations engaging in this practice were able to avoid the
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Although the response to this criticism is that conservation measures
should be taken in the form of multilateral treaties rather than unilat-
eral measures, the present case illustrates that such treaties are not
always possible. Since Mexico and other Latin American nations
have a strong interest in purse seining in the ETP, 197 it is unlikely that
they will forego this practice.
The Mexican Tuna Panel's finding is also inconsistent with an-
other GATT dispute resolution panel's analysis of Article XX(b).
That panel recently mediated the United States' dispute with Thai-
land over Thailand's restrictions on cigarette imports.198 Similar to
the United States' argument in its dispute with Mexico, Thailand also
justified its measures as health policies falling within the GATT
Article XX(b) exception. 199 As in the United States-Mexico tuna em-
bargo case,200 the Thai Cigarette Panel found that Thailand's meas-
ures were not "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(b). 201
The Thai Cigarette Panel further stated that Thailand's import re-
strictions "could be considered 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(b)
only if there were no alternative measures consistent with the General
Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reason-
ably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives." 20 2
Although both the Mexican Tuna Panel and the Thai Cigarette Panel
refused to accept the Article XX(b) claims, in the United States-Thai-
land case, the United States suggested several alternatives to Thai-
land's policy, thereby demonstrating that Thailand's measures were
not "necessary. ' 203 The Thai Cigarette Panel did not place the bur-
den of proof on Thailand, even though Thailand was the party invok-
ing Article XX. In the United States-Mexico dispute, however, the
Mexican Tuna Panel did impose the burden of proving necessity on
the United States. The Mexican Tuna Panel stated that, since the
United States was invoking an Article XX(b), it had the burden of
MMPA until the embargo was enforced. If the Panel's report is accepted, this practice will be
likely to increase. Conversely, if extrajurisdictional application of the MMPA is allowed, this
practice should decrease because United States tuna fishers will lose incentive to register under
other nation's flags, since these nations will also be subject to restrictions on dolphin takings.
197. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
198. Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes: Report of
the Panel, GATT Doc. DSIO/R (Nov. 7, 1990) (available in 37 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 200) [hereinafter Thai Cigarette Panel Report].
199. Id. at 206.
200. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 46.
201. Thai Cigarette Panel Report, supra note 198, at 223.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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proving that its trade restrictions were "necessary. '" 204 Necessity was
to be proven by demonstrating that no alternative trade measures con-
sistent with the GATT existed. 20 5 Understandably, the United States
failed the daunting task of proving a negative. It would have been
more appropriate for the Mexican Tuna Panel to have placed the bur-
den on Mexico to prove that alternative trade measures existed.
C. Article XX(g)
The Mexican Tuna Panel's finding that GATT Article XX(g)
does not cover extrajurisdictional trade measures is also flawed. The
Panel first noted that a trade measure cannot be considered "primar-
ily aimed at" conservation, under Article XX(g), unless taken "in
conjunction with" domestic production or consumption restric-
tions. 20 6 Citing an earlier GATT dispute resolution panel report,
20 7
the Panel further stated that a trade measure could not be considered
"in conjunction with" domestic production or consumption restric-
tions unless "it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these [do-
mestic production or consumption] restrictions." 20 The Panel then
reasoned that a nation could only effectively restrict production or
consumption of an exhaustible natural resource to the extent that it
has jurisdiction over the production or consumption. 2°9 Thus, the
Panel concluded, the United States MMPA does not fall within Arti-
cle XX(g) because it applies outside the United States' jurisdiction.
210
The Panel's reasoning on this issue is unsound. The crux of its
analysis is based on the notion that a trade measure applied outside a
nation's physical borders cannot be "primarily aimed at" conserva-
tion because a nation cannot effectively restrict production or con-
sumption beyond its national territory. The purpose of the MMPA,
however, is clearly to conserve marine mammals. 211 Additionally, the
MMPA evidently has been effective at restricting the production of
tuna caught by purse seine methods. Had the MMPA not restricted
Mexico's production of tuna in this manner, Mexico would not have
brought this action.
204. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 43.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 46-47.
207. Canadian Salmon Panel Report, supra note 153.
208. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 46-47.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See generally, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
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The United States-Mexico tuna case is similar to a complaint
that the United States brought to the GATT against Canada regard-
ing Canadian restrictions on exports of Pacific Coast unprocessed
salmon and herring. 212 In that case, Canada sought to justify its ac-
tions under Article XX(g) of the GATT, which allows conservation
measures for exhaustible natural resources. 21 3 The United States ar-
gued that the measures in question were not "primarily aimed" at
conservation, but rather were disguised restrictions on international
trade.214 The Canadian Salmon Panel agreed with the United States'
position. 21
5
However, there are several important distinctions between the
Canadian Salmon Panel decision and the Mexican Tuna Panel deci-
sion. In the Canadian salmon case, Canada conceded that its trade
measures were not specifically conservationist measures, but were
measures effecting conservation. 21 6 In the Mexican tuna case, the
United States aggressively argued that the MMPA was primarily
aimed at conservation.217 Additionally, several aspects of Canada's
trade measure indicated that it was not "primarily aimed at" conser-
vation. First, the Canadian program applied not to salmon and her-
ring in general, but to salmon and herring in its unprocessed form. 21 8
By contrast, the United States MMPA applies to all yellowfin tuna
caught with purse seine methods in the ETP, regardless of whether
the tuna has been processed. 21 9 In addition, the Canadian Salmon
Panel considered the fact that Canada's limit on purchases of un-
processed salmon and herring only applied to foreign processors and
consumers, and not to domestic processors and consumers. 220 Con-
versely, the United States MMPA applies to both domestic tuna fish-
ers and fishers from other nations. 221 In light of these distinctions, the
Mexican Tuna Panel should have held that the MMPA is "primarily
aimed at" conservation and thus consistent with GATT Article
XX(g).
212. Canadian Salmon Panel Report, supra note 153.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 114.
217. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 19-24.
218. Canadian Salmon Panel Report, supra note 153, at 115.
219. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
220. Canadian Salmon Panel Report, supra note 153, at 115. The Canadian Salmon Panel
also examined two other factors that are not comparable with the Mexican tuna case.
221. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
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D. GATT and the Environment
The most serious problem with the Mexican Tuna Panel Report
is that it leaves virtually no avenues open for environmental protec-
tion measures that affect international trade. Since the GATT does
not specifically mention the environment, 222 the exceptions under Ar-
ticle XX 223 provide the only safeguards for national measures
designed to protect the global environment. Unfortunately, the Panel
stated that the GATT interprets Article XX very narrowly.224 In-
deed, the language of the present decision indicates that nations will
rarely be able to rely on Article XX to justify environmental regula-
tions affecting trade.225 Furthermore, GATT panels have currently
examined five disputes involving environmental measures, 226 and in
none of these disputes has a panel ruled that environmental regula-
tions were consistent with the GATT. 227 This record suggests that
the GATT needs to be updated to allow nations to address environ-
mental problems.
Moreover, if the full Council accepts the Mexican Tuna Panel's
ruling, serious ramifications could result for many environmental
laws. According to an attorney for the Environmental Protection
Agency, many areas for potential collision between environmental
and trade laws exist. 228 As the present case illustrates, trade can com-
promise or invalidate environmental laws. 229 In addition, the GATT
may generally view environmental laws as impermissible barriers to
trade.230 Furthermore, the world community as a whole currently fa-
vors free trade over environmental protection.23'
222. See generally GATT, supra note 56.
223. Id. art. XX.
224. See supra text accompanying note 169.
225. See Panel Report, supra note 18, at 43-50.
226. See GATT Dispute-Settlement and Trade-Environment Measures, Focus (GATT
Newsletter), Oct. 1991, at 4.
227. Id.
228. Deadlines Approach for Two GATTAirbus Complaints, Boeing Official Tells ABA, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1628 (Nov. 6, 1991) (statement of Peter Lallas of the
Environmental Protection Agency).
229. See generally Swing Supporters of NAFTA Talks Urge Agreement on Environmental
Protection, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1621 (Nov. 6, 1991).
230. Deadlines Approach for Two GATT Airbus Complaints, Boeing Official Tells ABA,
supra note 228.
231. In reference to the GATT decision, a European Commission official stated that "we
have to avoid creating new non-tariff barriers." GA TT Official Assesses Tuna Decision's Im-
pact on Link Between Environment, Trade, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1505 (Oct. 16,
1991).
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Environmentalists have also expressed concern that the ruling
will invalidate many existing trade practices designed to protect the
environment. 232 For example, international trade sanctions designed
to halt the trade of endangered species, or the trade in rare hardwoods
and shipments of toxic wastes, now may be illegal under GATT
rules. 233 A representative of the Humane Society of the United States
has stated that the decision "reduces environmental law to the lowest
common denominator, and sets a deadly precedent for worldwide en-
vironmental protection.
234
E. Ramifications of the Panel Decision for the North American
Free Trade Agreement
On February 5, 1991, the leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States announced that they would negotiate a North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 235 NAFTA's objective is to
eliminate tariffs, trade quotas, import licensing, and other traditional
trade barrriers. 236 Because the United States and Canada already
have a free trade agreement, most of the negotiation centers on Mex-
ico. 237 However, environmental concerns have played an important
part in Congress' discussions of NAFTA. 238 Indeed, these concerns
almost prevented Congress from initially approving the
negotiations.2
39
Since the Mexican tuna decision, environmentalists have become
increasingly alarmed about NAFTA's potential consequences to the
environment. In a letter to United States Trade Representative Carla
Hills, an attorney representing the Humane Society argued that Mex-
232. See Auerbach, supra note 109. "Environmental groups have been fighting the current
Uruguay Round of free-trade talks for years, arguing that new GATT rules could weaken U.S.
health, safety and environmental protection laws by labeling them as trade barriers in much
the same way Mexico characterized the law to save dolphins." Id. See also David Crosson,
Dolphin Killings Ruffle Trade Pact, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 27, 1991.
233. David Clark Scott, Mexico Wins Battle Over U.S. Tuna Ban, but Backs Off to Save
Image, Trade Talks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 27, 1991, at 8.
234. House Members Spearhead Congressional Opposition to Dolphin-Deadly Trade Ruling,
PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (statement by
Patricia Forkan, senior vice president of the Humane Society of the United States).
235. M. Delal Baer, North American Free Trade, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1991, at 132.
236. Wesley Smith, Guidelines for US. Negotiators at the Trade Talks with Mexico, HERI-
TAGE FOUND. REP., Oct. 18, 1991, at 861.
237. Id.
238. See Baucus Concerned About NAFTA Talks' Pace, Warns Environment, Trade Must
Be Linked, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 271 (Feb. 12, 1992).
239. Keith Bradsher, Company News; US. Ban on Mexico Tuna is Overruled, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1991, at DI.
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ico's GATT challenge "could result in a serious crippling of the do-
mestic environmental laws the U.S. has carefully pieced together over
the past twenty-five years. ' ' 240 She further questioned how Mexico
could "expect to be a full partner with the U.S. when it uses the
GATT to avoid U.S. environmental laws?" 241
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's concern over
NAFTA prompted his decision to defer Mexico's challenge of the
United States' embargo in the GATT.242 NAFTA is extremely im-
portant to Salinas, who sees the treaty as a way to sustain domestic
reforms he claims are improving the quality of life for Mexican
citizens.243
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE MMPA
This section of the Comment discusses specific problems of the
MMPA. This section first notes that the Panel correctly concluded
that the MMPA's variable standards for foreign fishers produced an
unfair result for foreign nations. Next, this section analyzes the spe-
cial concerns of applying national environmental standards such as
the MMPA to less developed countries such as Mexico.
A. Variable Standards for Foreign Nations
In response to the United States' position that Article XX of the
GATT justifies the MMPA, the Mexican Tuna Panel emphasized that
the MMPA applies different restrictions to dolphin takings by foreign
nations than it applies to takings by the United States. 244 Specifically,
under the MMPA, foreign tuna fishers who export to the United
States may not take more than 1.25 times the number of dolphins the
United States takes in a given year.245 At first glance, this rule ap-
pears to benefit foreign nations because their limit on dolphin takings
is higher than the limit for the United States. However, as the Mexi-
can Tuna Panel revealed, foreign nations have no way to know
240. NAFTA Public Hearings Conclude with Recommendations, Warnings, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1361 (Sept. 18, 1991).
241. Id.
242. The agreement not to pursue the challenge to the United States' embargo was reached
during the annual meeting of the United States-Mexico Binational Commission. Mexico
Agrees to Defer Action on Complaint on US. Tuna Embargo, 8 Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Sept.
20, 1991).
243. Larry D. Hatfield, Salinas Hails Common Market, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 1, 1991, at
A4.
244. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 46-47.
245. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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whether their policies conform to the MMPA under this rule.246
Thus, the Panel determined that the MMPA failed to satisfy both the
GATT Article XX(b) requirement that a measure must be "necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, '247 and the GATT
Article XX(g) requirement that the measure needs to be "primarily
aimed at" conservation of dolphins.248
Regardless of whether the Panel is correct in its determination
that the MMPA fails the requirements of GATT Article XX(b) and
Article XX(g), the Panel highlights the fact that this variable stan-
dard for foreign fleets is unfair. The uncertainty of this standard
could cause foreign tuna fleets to suffer economic injury in any given
year if they fail to meet this unpredictable criterion. Moreover, under
this standard, foreign fleets can be subject to stricter limits than
United States fleets. Recall that the United States has imposed a flat
limit on dolphin takings at 20,500,249 and foreign nations can take no
more than 1.25 times the number that the United States actually
takes. If the United States takes less than 15,600 dolphins in a given
year, the ceiling for foreign nations will be less than 20,500. Indeed,
foreign nations actually were subject to a stricter limit than the
United States in 1990, as the United States' dolphin taking rate was
well under 15,600.250 Thus, while the United States claims that its
standards for foreign fleets are more liberal than those for the United
States' fleets,251 in practice, they are actually more stringent.
B. Economic Concerns of Less Developed Countries
Underlying this dispute over the United States' embargo on Mex-
ican tuna is the theory that a nation's concern for the environment is
directly proportional to the strength of its economy. 25 2 Less devel-
oped countries such as Mexico often consider environmental protec-
tion a concern for rich nations. 253 In essence, even if the government
of a less developed country acknowledges that it has environmental
246. Panel Report, supra note 18, at 46-47.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 174-77.
248. See supra text accompanying note 182.
249. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
250. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission estimates that the United States was
responsible for 12,643 dolphin deaths in 1989 and 5,083 in 1990. COMMITTEE ON REDUCING
PORPOISE MORTALITY FROM TUNA FISHING, REDUCING DOLPHIN MORTALITY FROM TUNA
FISHING 4 (1992).
251. See Panel Report, supra note 18, at 12.
252. Runge, supra note 118, at 52.
253. Id.
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problems, it generally considers increasing its level of production to
be a more pressing matter.254
According to a report issued by the Conference Board of
Canada,
Many developing countries are currently poised to use environ-
mentally harmful products and technologies that were instrumen-
tal in bringing the industrialized countries to their current level of
prosperity. These include the proposed large-scale use of
chlorofluorocarbons for refrigeration in India and burning of high-
sulfur coal reserves for power generation in China. ... 255
The United States and other highly industrialized nations must be
sensitive to the fact that environmental concerns did not exist during
their developing years.256 Because less developed countries that wish
to industrialize must do so against the current backdrop of environ-
mental regulations, the industrialized nations need to devise a plan to
share the burden of these regulations with developing nations. 257 In-
deed, the Canadian report further states that "[i]t is likely that partici-
pation of developing countries in global [environmental] efforts will
not be forth-coming without compensation. Debt, commodity prices,
protectionism toward developing countries, financial and technologi-
cal transfers all promise to feature prominently in any future global
negotiations."'258
VII. SOLUTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO TRADE
DISPUTE
A. Amending the MMPA
As the Mexican Tuna Panel illuminated in its decision, the
MMPA provisions that tie the foreign dolphin taking limit to the
United States' actual taking rate for a given year 259 are unfair. 260 The
United States should amend the MMPA to provide a specific limit on
254. Id.
255. Conflicting Trade and Environment Goals Threaten Competitiveness, Report Con-
cludes, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1627 (Nov. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Conflicting Trade
and Environment Goals].
256. See generally Mark Allen Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An
Assessment, 20 ENVTL. L. 291 (1990).
257. The Canadian report proposes a shift toward incentive-based environmental stan-
dards. For example, the report suggests that nations might use such methods as tradeable
emissions permits. See Conflicting Trade and Environment Goals, supra note 255.
258. Id.
259. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
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dolphin takings for both the United States and foreign tuna fleets.
This limit must be the same for all tuna fishers. These changes would
solve the problem of the unpredictable limit on foreign fleets, 26' as
well as the problem of discrimination between the United States and
foreign fleets.
262
B. Inclusion of Environmental Provisions in the NAFTA
Although serious concerns about NAFTA's implications on the
environment exist,263 the NAFTA negotiations could be an opportu-
nity to promote the linkage between trade and the environment. 264 If
NAFTA included environmental regulations, many issues such as the
current tuna embargo dispute may be resolved. Furthermore, the
NAFTA negotiations can give the United States an opportunity to
affect many of Mexico's environmental policies that, in turn, affect the
United States.
265
Because Congress will be unable to modify the agreement once it
has been approved, 266 Congress should require that NAFTA provide
for satisfactory environmental regulations at the outset.267 NAFTA
should include a dispute settlement process to address environmental
concerns. 268 In addition, NAFTA should permit its parties to amend
their environmental regulations so that the regulations are consistent
with current scientific knowledge.
C. Amending the GAIT
Currently, the GATT is deficient in the area of environmental
protection. In light of present worldwide environmental conditions,
the GATT must be updated. Perhaps the solution to this dilemma
lies with the recently convened Group on Environmental Measures
and International Trade. 269 The Group's agenda is as follows: trade
261. Id.
262. See Panel Report, supra note 18, at 10.
263. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., Baucus Calls, supra note 3.
265. For example, NAFTA could allow the United States to help Mexico amend its clean
air regulations. Furthermore, NAFTA negotiations could give the United States an opportu-
nity to help Mexico with its sewage treatment problems in Baja California.
266. Smith, supra note 236.
267. See International Trade: Sen. Baucus Expresses Concern About Fast Pace of NAFTA
Talks, Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA), at A3 (Feb. 7, 1992).
268. This environmental code could be similar to Baucus' plan for the GATT. See Baucus
Calls, supra note 3.
269. GA TT to Focus on Trade and Environment Link, Focus (GAT1" Newsletter), Oct.
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provisions contained in existing multilateral environmental agree-
ments (e.g., the Montreal Protocol); multilateral transparency of na-
tional environmental regulations likely to effect trade; and trade
effects of new packaging and labeling requirements aimed at protect-
ing the environment.270 According to GATT representative David
Woods, the GATT has recognized that the intersection between envi-
ronmental regulations and international trade is a political reality.27'
The GATT also should consider the plan suggested by United
States Senator Max Baucus. Senator Baucus advocates that the
GATT incorporate an environmental code and dispute settlement
mechanism, modeled after the current subsidies code. 272 The code
would remedy the "obvious deficiency" in the GATT, that its regula-
tions put trade law above environmental considerations. 273 The objec-
tive of such a code would allow nations to promote legitimate
environmental goals by setting reasonable standards. 274 According to
Senator Baucus, an environmental code should permit nations to set
their own environmental protection standards. 275 If imported prod-
ucts or the processes used to produce them do not meet the importing
nation's environmental standards, then duties can be applied provided
the following criteria are met: (1) the importing nation's environmen-
tal protection standards have a sound scientific basis; (2) the stan-
dards are applied equally to domestic production; and (3) the
imported products cause economic injury to competitive domestic
production.276 Baucus' plan also calls for the GATT to establish an
environmental dispute settlement body similar to the one established
by the subsidies code. 2
77
In addition, Senator Baucus has suggested that the next round of
GATT negotiations focus primarily on environmental issues.278
While such protracted negotiations are necessary to bring the GATT
1991, at 1. The GATT Council originally established the Group in 1971, but the Group had
never met. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2.
272. Baucus Calls, supra note 3.
273. Nancy Dunne, U.S. Calls for a GATT Code on Environment, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1991, at 6.
274. Id.
275. Baucus Calls, supra note 3.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Trade: US. Senator Calls for GA TT "Green Round," INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 30,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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up to date with environmental issues, preliminary discussions should
begin immediately. As the United States tuna embargo dispute dem-
onstrates, the link between the environment and trade is a serious
problem. The Contracting Parties need to begin discussions immedi-
ately on ways to equip the GATT to deal with the environment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the recent Mexican Tuna Panel Report's 279 disapproval of
the United States trade embargo on Mexican tuna may have been le-
gally correct in part, the GATT is out of touch with environmental
concerns. Certain provisions of the United States MMPA 280 may be
prejudicial to foreign nations. 28 1 However, the broad language of the
Panel's ruling requires that environmental trade measures affect only
the product and not the production method, 282 and refuses to permit
any extrajurisdictional environmental measures affecting trade.28 3
This language is not supported by the text of the GATT nor by past
GATT panel decisions. This recent decision, along with past deci-
sions involving environmental measures, leaves almost no room for
environmental regulations that affect trade. As this conflict demon-
strates, nations can no longer ignore environmental concerns in their
negotiations on free trade. Thus, the GATT, along with other free
trade agreements, must include provisions for environmental
protection.
Elizabeth E. Kruis
279. Panel Report, supra note 18.
280. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
281. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
282. See supra text accompanying note 163.
283. See supra text accompanying notes notes 170-81.
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